U.S. policy is adrift in uncharted waters over a nuclear Iran
Charles J. Brown
The Daily Star (Lebanon)
April 29, 2006

Remember "duck and cover" drills in grade school? Fifty years ago, our leaders believed that the best response to the threat of nuclear warfare was to encourage children to crawl under their desks and curl into a ball. Today we know that "duck and cover" wouldn't have worked. But our current approach to the specter of nuclear proliferation isn't much more sophisticated.

Over the past 10 years, we've seen the size of the nuclear club nearly double, from five (United States, Russia, France, Great Britain and China) to nine (Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea). We've seen the George W. Bush administration claim it had to go to war to prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring "weapons of mass destruction." We've seen the emergence of a nuclear black market where countries like Libya have been able to purchase bomb components. We've seen North Korea go nuclear without much of an international response and Iran threaten to follow.

Toto, I don't think we're in the 1950s anymore. Yet the Bush administration continues to pursue policies that are at best inconsistent and at worst utterly crazy. How else to explain the administration's insistence on Iran adhering to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at the same time that it has signed an agreement with India that violates it?

The reality is that we're in uncharted waters here. Neither the promise contained in the NPT - that non-nuclear weapons signatories will "benefit" from "peaceful" uses of nuclear technology - nor the Bush administration's ad hoc approach is working. The security of the U.S. - and of the world - depends on coming up with something new.

A good start would be to acknowledge the reality that in its attempt to bribe countries into compliance, the NPT merely skims the surface of more complex concerns. It fails to acknowledge the real reasons that so many countries are interested in going nuclear: security, international prestige, nationalism and economic growth.

Any attempt to understand a government's desire for nuclear weapons must start with this four-point framework. Take the contrasting cases of India, a country that has good relations with the U.S., and Iran, a republic whose relations with the U.S. could hardly be much worse.

Security: Both India and Iran claim sticky relations with neighboring nuclear states (Pakistan and Israel, respectively) that they argue can't be trusted. Shortly after Bush's trip to India, Pakistan test-fired a missile without announcing it in advance. In fact, Pakistan is so unreliable that the Bush administration has rebuffed its request to sign an agreement similar to the one the U.S. has with India. Even though the tables are turned in the case of Iran, its government - and citizens - may be reluctant to obey NPT regulations if non-signatory Israel has access to nuclear weapons.

International prestige: Both governments feel strongly that nuclear weapons will rank them among the global elite. Feeding this is the long-held belief by many countries that the NPT creates an untenable double standard, with the five recognized nuclear powers allowed to possess nuclear weapons simply because they had them at the time of the treaty's adoption in 1970. Further fueling perceptions of a "prestige gap" is the reality that the U.S. and other nuclear states have failed to substantially draw down their stockpiles - an estimated 20,000 active nuclear weapons still exist.

Nationalism: Both countries' nuclear programs enjoy strong domestic support that extends beyond nationalists and extremists to include democrats and moderates. Any effort to deny states nuclear power must find ways to address the perceived wounds to national pride that any "withdrawal" would imply.

Economic growth: Both India and Iran's economies are in need of new sustainable energy supplies. Renewable energy sources like solar, wind and hydro can address these concerns without creating the kinds of challenges and threats posed by the use of nuclear energy. But shifting from nonrenewable to renewable energy will require a much greater degree of commitment from the original five nuclear states.

The international community must address the security concerns driving nations to seek nuclear weapons. Enforcement of the NPT is important, but won't by itself end the growing temptation to go nuclear. We need to find new solutions that complement - not replace - the NPT.

The Bush administration could demonstrate real leadership by recognizing that no country will listen to the U.S. as long as it continues to pursue policies that undermine the NPT. It could also demonstrate leadership by supporting renewable energy.

The administration has two choices. It can maintain its current approach - and ensure future crises. Or it can identify global norms that will help other nations believe that their security, prestige and economic development are not dependent upon going nuclear. America's security - and that of the world - demands that it choose the latter.

Charles Brown is the president and CEO of Citizens for Global Solutions, an American organization that encourages the U.S. to engage the world.

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